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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the separation of the Ellice Islands from the Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands Colony, in the central Pacific, in 1975: one of the few agreed boundary changes 
that were made during decolonization. Under the name Tuvalu, the Ellice Group became the 
world’s fourth smallest state and gained independence in 1978. The Gilbert Islands, (including 
the  Phoenix  and  Line  Islands),  became  the  Republic of  Kiribati  in  1979.  A  survey  of  the 
tortuous creation of the colony is followed by an analysis of the geographic, ethnic, language, 
religious, economic, and administrative differences between the groups. When, belatedly, the 
British  began  creating  representative  institutions,  the  largely  Polynesian,  Protestant,  Ellice 
people  realized  they  were  doomed  to  permanent  minority  status  while  combined  with  the 
Micronesian, half-Catholic, Gilbertese. To protect their identity they demanded separation, and 
the British accepted this after a UN-observed referendum. 
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Context 
The  age  of  imperialism  saw  most  of  the  world  divided  up  by  colonial  powers  that  drew 
arbitrary lines on maps to designate their properties. The age of decolonization involved the 
assumption  of  sovereign  independence  by  these,  often  artificial,  creations.  Tuvalu,  in  the 
central  Pacific,  lying  roughly  half-way  between  Australia  and  Hawaii,  is  a  rare  exception. 
Consisting of nine islands with a total land area of only  25 km
2 situated along  a 600 km 
north/south spread, it became the fourth smallest country in the world by separating from the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. Tuvalu’s secession deserves study as a rare case of agreed 
boundary-change before decolonization was accomplished. 
The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (GEIC) lay astride the equator in the central Pacific 
between Longitude 150
0W and 170
0W. It is spread over 5 million km
2 of ocean. The distance 
from  Ocean  Island  (Banaba,  pronounced  Baan-aba),  lying  west  of  the  Gilbert  group,  to 
Christmas Island (Kiritimati), part of the Line Islands in the east, is 3,680 km. From Makin (in 
the northern Gilberts) to Niulakita (most southerly of the Ellice Group) is 1,680 km. The total 
land area was just over 800 km
2, on a mix of coral atolls and reef islands. Geographic isolation 
presented  unusual  challenges  for  administrative  supervision  and  precluded  any  sense  of 
common community among the islanders. Moreover, the atoll environment severely limited 
economic activity. Scarcity of land, poor soil, and uncertain rainfall restricted edible plant life W. D. McIntyre 
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to coconut palms, pandanus, and root crops grown in pits. Rain water had to be stored and 
fishing in the ocean was vital for sustaining life. 
Partition of the GEIC into two separate dependent territories occurred in 1975. The Ellice 
Islands,  renamed  Tuvalu  (‘eight  standing  together’)  went  on  to  independence  as  a 
Commonwealth  Realm  three  years  later.  The  rest  of  the  Colony  followed  in  1979  as  the 
Republic of Kiribati (pronounced Ki-ri-bass). Such fragmentation of already small populations 
(7,000 and 53,000 respectively) went very much against the grain of British administrative 
practice. When they first contemplated the Ellice separatist demand Whitehall officials deemed 
it  ‘a  nonsense’.  It  also  went  against  the  grain  of  UN  thinking:  its  Special  Committee  on 
Decolonization demanded freedom for all colonies, but deplored fragmentation, and did not try 
to  unscramble  the  (usually  artificial)  borders  created  by  imperialism.  Small  states  were  a 
potential nuisance. Secretary-General U Thant even suggested in 1967 that a line had to be 
drawn at some point to deter mini-states from seeking UN membership. But, with their formal 
adoption of a policy of ‘accelerated decolonization’ in 1975, the British were determined to get 
themselves ‘off the colonial hook’. The official mantra was that they had no wish to force 
dependencies  into  constitutional  arrangements  they  did  not  want.  But  they  were  acutely 
embarrassed by the precedents of Rhodesia’s UDI in 1965 and the notorious Caribbean episode 
of Anguilla’s secession from the Associate State of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla in 1967. Therefore, 
after the Ellice Islanders had expressed themselves decisively in a referendum, observed by a 
UN  Visiting  Mission,  the  British  gave  way  and  organized  the  new  dependent  territory  of 
Tuvalu, while at the same time trying to ensure that this would not prejudice the future of the 
rest of the GEIC.  
This article examines the motivation and methods for the separation of Tuvalu. It is based on 
communications with some key participants, a scan of relevant (mainly political and historical) 
literature, conversations with other scholars, along with unpublished correspondence accessed 
from now publically available archives of the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO). 
Motives 
For the motives, one must first look at historical, cultural, and political aspects. A brief outline 
history of the  creation of the Colony serves to underline its inherent  division. The British 
Government was only reluctantly involved in the Islands. The annexation of New Zealand in 
1840 had been followed by conflicts with the indigenous Maori and eventually to a decade of 
warfare. Thus when a naval officer rashly annexed Hawai’i in 1843 the move was repudiated. 
But  the  activities  of  colonists  from  New  Zealand  and  from  the  Australian  colonies  as 
missionaries, traders, planters, and labour recruiters in the islands led to the annexation of Fiji 
in 1874. There were also some ambitious schemes in the settler colonies for more extensive 
expansion and demands that the British Government should move into New Guinea, the Cook 
Islands, Tonga, and Samoa (Morrell, 1960). After acquiring Fiji, the Secretary of State for 
Colonies determined to resist this clamour and deal with the problems caused by the activities 
of British subjects from the colonies by ‘another means’. The Governor of Fiji was made High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific in 1877 with Consuls in other islands appointed Deputy-
Commissioners to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects (McIntyre, 1960: 274-94). When 
this proved inadequate to stem the harsh activities of labour recruiters, who moved north as far 
as Micronesia, naval officers were authorized by the Pacific Islanders Act of 1882 to exercise                   The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
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jurisdiction over British subjects and in cases of dispute with Islanders, were authorized to 
resort to “acts of war” (Scarr, 1968: 169-175). 
After  Britain  and  Germany  agreed  to  divide  the  Pacific  into  spheres  of  influence  in  1886 
(revised in 1899), the somewhat illogical line between them put northeast New Guinea, New 
Britain, New Ireland, and the northern Solomon Islands in the German sphere, leaving the rest 
of the Solomons, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and other groups to the east of the line, for the 
British. And since intermittent naval patrols failed to ensure security for traders or to suppress 
kidnapping, and there were rumours that the United States might intervene in the region, the 
German Government persuaded the British Government to take a more active role in its sphere, 
the motive being to protect the supply of labourers for German plantations in Samoa. Thus, in 
1892 the Gilbert and Ellice Islands were proclaimed Protectorates based on treaties with island 
elders. The Solomon Islands followed the same path in 1893 (Munro & Firth, 1986: 63-71). 
Another  complication  was  soon  added  by  the  activities  of  the  Pacific  Islands  Company 
registered in London in 1897. It had influential directors close to the Colonial Office and it 
mooted  the  idea  of  a  chartered  company  to  take  over  the  whole  region.  It  attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to create large plantations in the Solomon Islands. Then in 1900, after rich 
phosphate deposits were discovered on Ocean Island (Banaba), an agreement was made with 
some Banabans by New Zealander Arthur Ellis for the company to mine phosphate on the 
island for an annual rental of £50, provided that any land bearing fruit trees was avoided. In 
applying to the Colonial Office for a license to export phosphate, the company suggested that 
Ocean Island be added to the Protectorate. But the chairman of the company, Lord Stanmore 
(who  as  Sir  Arthur  Gordon  had  been  first  High  Commissioner  for  the  Western  Pacific), 
persuaded the Colonial Office to annex Ocean Island. This was done on 28 September 1901 by 
a naval officer, who by proclamation made the island British territory under the supervision of 
the Resident Commissioner of the Protectorate. The company’s licence required payment of 
six  pence  per  ton  of  its  exports  to  the  Treasury.  In  the  following  year  the  company 
amalgamated with the German firm, Jaluit Gesellschaft, which had acquired phosphate mining 
rights on nearby  Nauru, to create the Pacific Phosphate Company, which embarked on  an 
exceedingly profitable extractive industry on Nauru and Ocean Islands, eventually taken over 
by the British Phosphate Commission (a joint UK-Australian-New Zealand state enterprise) 
after the First World War. 
For convenience of communications and to keep an eye on the operations of the phosphate 
industry,  from  which  most  of  the  Protectorate’s  revenue  ensued,  the  administrative 
headquarters was moved to Ocean Island in 1908. Only then was it realized what “a shockingly 
bad bargain” the Banabans had made (Scarr, 1968: 275). As the company continued to seek 
more and more land to mine, the Resident Commissioner insisted that a fairer price should be 
paid and that an additional six pence per ton be paid into a Trust Fund to purchase a new home 
island for the 400 Banabans should their homeland eventually become uninhabitable. It also 
became evident that administering the far flung Protectorate from one small British territory 
was leading to jurisdictional anomalies as to what law would apply in the different cases of 
British subjects, foreigners, and indigenous islanders. From about 1912, the suggestion was 
being mooted that the Protectorate, and also certain other islands that had been acquired earlier, 
should be brought within one legal jurisdiction under British sovereignty. This process started 
with the 10 November 1915 Order in Council making the Protectorate into the Gilbert and W. D. McIntyre 
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Ellice Islands Colony (GEIC). Ocean Island was added to it on 27 January 1916, along with the 
northern Line Islands that had been acquired in 1889. These included Washington (Teraina) 
and  Fanning  (Tabuera).  Later  in  1916,  the  Union  Group  (Tokelau)  was  also  included. 
Christmas  Island  (Kiritimati)  most  northerly  of  the  Line  Islands  was  added  in  1919.  The 
Tokelau Islands were transferred to New Zealand administration working from Samoa in 1926. 
When population pressure indicated the need for more land for the Gilbertese, the Phoenix 
Islands Settlement Scheme was hatched, and eight of the Phoenix Islands were added to the 
Colony in 1937 (Maude, 1968: 315-342). In these ways, the GEIC became a diverse and very 
scattered incremental dependency, the legacy of a complex history.  
This jurisdictional complexity was reinforced by the advent of Christianity, which came to the 
Gilbert Islands first, from 1857, through the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions, a Protestant body based in Massachusetts, using Hawaiian missionaries. These were 
followed by the Congregationalist  London Missionary Society  (LMS) from Samoa.  But in 
1888 the Catholic Sacred Heart Mission, based in France, also entered the Gilberts and would 
engender what became the majority faith (Macdonald, 1982: 31-53). Thus, while the Ellice 
Group  by  mid  20
th-Century  was  overwhelmingly  Protestant,  in  the  Gilberts  over  half  the 
population were Catholic. Despite the intra-archipelago variations, it was the inter-archipelago 
variations that were significant, and these were accentuated by cultural diversity.  
All but one of the Ellice Islands was peopled by Polynesians. The darker-skinned Gilbertese 
and Banabans were Micronesian. The Ellice Islanders, of Tongan and Samoan origin, were 
very  status  conscious,  with  traditional  social  structures  in  which  hereditary  aliki  were 
recognized as leaders whose authority was respected. Their assistants, tao aliki, looked after 
governing, working through the male heads of households. Within such island hierarchies all 
were bonded in communities. European traders from the 1820s introduced new material goods, 
but it was the coming of the LMS missionaries from the 1860s that introduced new sources of 
authority. Samoan pastors of the LMS came to rival the aliki in power and prestige (Munro, 
1996: 124-57; Laracy, 1983: 19-24). In the Gilberts, the hierarchical principle was tempered by 
a system of rule by councils of elders, the unimane, who gathered in village meeting houses, 
maneaba, where careful mediation over the allocation of the limited land enabled the people to 
survive in an environment with scarce natural resources (Macdonald, 1982: 6-10).  
For much of the colonial period, the two groups of islanders had little contact. They were under 
one government but nothing was done to foster a common identity and the two groups spoke 
different  languages.  By  administering  the  different  cultural  groups  as  one  political  entity, 
regulations framed initially for the Gilberts were inappropriately applied to the Ellice. Then 
with the development of education and the building of King George V School, as government 
secondary school for boys, at Bairaki in the Gilberts, and the Elaine Bernacchi School for girls, 
promising Ellice students had to travel and reside there. The same was true for getting hospital 
treatment. There was also growing employment by the British Phosphate Commission in their 
facilities at Nauru and Ocean Island, and later employment in the civil service at Tarawa, the 
seat of government. In both cases, the Ellice Islanders fared better than the Gilbertese, partly 
through the influence of Donald Kennedy, a domineering schoolteacher at the Ellice Island 
school during the 1920s, who emphasized English language and academic achievement, and 
partly because of the disruption of Gilbertese development by the Japanese occupation during 
the Second World War. Thus, Ellice Islanders won disproportionately more scholarships and                   The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
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gained positions in the Colony public service relative to their population numbers. Political 
stirrings in the 1960s arose through Gilbertese resentment of the alleged Polynesian superiority 
of their Ellice colleagues (Butcher, 2012: 28-31; Macdonald, 1982: 134-8). 
If it was ethnic rivalry rather than anti-colonialist ideology that was the spark to politicization 
in the GEIC, it was anti-colonialist pressures in the United Nations rather than British liberal 
constitutionalism that led the British belatedly to contemplate leaving. The political awakening 
of the 1960s was preceded by a 20-year period when the idea of decolonization for the GEIC 
was firmly discounted. Shortly after the dismantling of the British Empire started with the 
flourish  of  independence  for  India,  Pakistan,  Ceylon  and  Burma  in  1947-48,  the  Colonial 
Office’s ‘Smaller Territories Enquiry’ of 1949-51 investigated the 26 smallest dependencies, 
most of which were deemed too small, scattered, economically unviable, and lacking in trained 
personnel for independence. As African decolonization began with the independence of Sudan 
in 1956 and Ghana in 1957, the ‘Audit of Empire’ on the remaining dependencies done during 
1957-59 proved inconclusive as a guide to policy and its finding relating to the GEIC was that, 
if  the  British  were  to  withdraw,  the  group  “would  relapse  into  primitive  savagery  unless 
another  civilized  country  assumed  the  administration”.  To  give  up  the  islands  would,  it 
reported, be “discreditable” (CO Print, 1957: 73-5). UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 
‘Wind of Change’ speech in 1960 was focused on Africa. Faced in the same year with the UN 
‘Declaration  on  Decolonization’,  calling  for  the  independence  of  all  colonies,  most  of  the 
colonial powers abstained. Only New Zealand, Netherlands, and the Soviet Union voted in 
favour. In refuting charges made by the Soviet representative during the General Assembly 
debate  on  28  November  1960,  David  Ormsby-Gore  defended  Britain’s  record  of  giving 
independence to 500 million people. But he went on to say it could not dictate the future of 
small countries. It was not for Britain to say that the Gilbertese should decide immediately 
what form of independence they might ultimately choose (Ormsby-Gore, 1960: 985). 
Through most of the colonial period in the GEIC traditional patterns of rule were adapted to 
serve the very slender government regime that could be afforded. For each island a high chief 
was recognized and the elders met in island councils. The new element that was added was the 
appointment of a Native Magistrate, who met with the Council of Elders as juries. To back up 
the magistrate there was a policeman and scribe. British District Officers wrote rule books and 
exercised intermittent supervision (Macdonald, 1982: 77-84). 
Representative  institutions  were  somewhat  slow  to  develop  because  of  sheer  problems  of 
distance and logistics. First there were conferences of Native Magistrates, who had become 
powerful local figures: colonial creations that had attenuated the standing of the traditional 
elders. Then, every two years from 1956 to 1963, there were Colony Conferences involving the 
Magistrates,  regional  representatives  elected  by  Island  Councils,  missionary  delegates,  and 
civil servants. This became the forum for airing grievances and where government departments 
could explain policies. A more conventional colonial government was erected by Order-in-
Council of 1963, with an Executive Council that the Resident Commissioner was obliged to 
consult, but was not bound by, and an Advisory Council in which some 8 to 12 non-officials 
met with civil servants to discuss proposed legislation. At the same time, some tension between 
Gilbertese  and  Ellice  members  of  the  public  service  surfaced.  One  disgruntled  Gilbertese 
complained that the Ellice men acted “as if they owned the Colony” (Macdonald, 1982: 227). 
In 1965, the Gilbertese National Party was formed. In the second half of the 1960s, the whole W. D. McIntyre 
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political atmosphere warmed up partly because of the looming prospects for self-government 
and  elected  representative  institutions,  and  also  because  of  awareness  of  decolonization  in 
neighbouring islands. 
As  they  moved  tentatively  towards  developing  some  organs  of  self-government,  British 
officials realized that the leap to a fully elected legislature would be premature. They envisaged 
a period when constitutional arrangements would “remain under a degree of tutelage”. They 
wanted to encourage greater participation by islanders, but not the imposition of some alien 
pattern. Val Anderson, the New Zealander who was Resident Commissioner from 1962 to 
1970, suggested something less complex than the Westminster parliamentary model and he 
was attracted to a modified version of the ‘County Hall system’ based on the London County 
Council whereby executive and legislative functions were exercised by a single body working 
through committees with civil servants to assist. He suggested that the Advisory Council could 
be converted to a House of Representatives elected by universal suffrage, which would start 
off, not as a legislature, but a forum for discussion. A new Governing Council would have both 
executive and legislative functions. It would consist of the Resident Commissioner, 4 officials, 
and 5 members elected by the House of Representatives led by a ‘Chief Elected Member’. This 
experiment was approved in 1967 and tried over the next three years as a way of advancing 
political development. 
The  single-council  experiment  was  short-lived  because  it  gave  little  power  to  the  elected 
members who were becoming aware of progress elsewhere. In UN Trust Territories, subject to 
international  accountability,  pioneering  Pacific  moves  to  independence  could  be  observed. 
Western Samoa was granted independence by New Zealand in 1962 and Nauru (a joint Trust of 
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, administered by Australia) gained independence in 1968 
and also control of its phosphate, both the resource and the infrastructure (Macdonald, 1988: 
54-8). Many Gilbert and Ellice men had worked on Nauru and Hammer de Roburt, the Head 
Chief  and  first  President,  was  part-Banaban  by  birth,  and  was  a  friend  of  Reuben  Uatioa 
(pronounced  Wa-see-or),  the  most  outspoken  of  the  Gilbertese  elected  members.  In  the 
aftermath of Nauru’s independence, the political atmosphere of the GEIC quickened. 
Further constitutional advance  was made by Order in Council in 1970. As David Murray, 
Professor of Public Administration at the University of the South Pacific, put it, the GEIC 
moved  on  to  “the  standard  British  colonial  tramlines”  (Murray,  1982:  126).  A  Legislative 
Council  (LegCo)  commenced  operating  on  1  March  1971  consisting  of  5  officials  and  28 
elected members. In the Executive Council a ‘Member system’ was begun whereby elected 
members were associated with particular government departments and Reuben Uatioa became 
‘Leader of Government Business’. At the same time the GEIC was detached from the Western 
Pacific High Commission and given its own Governor. 
The new constitutional arrangements exposed the Gilbertese and Ellice antagonisms. Because 
of the population balance, the Ellice members could never be more than a permanent minority 
in  the  Legislative  Council.  They  now  demanded  separation.  They  perceived  they  would 
become a neglected minority group and in danger of losing their identity. They feared the 
tyranny of the majority. At a special ‘Forum Session’ of the LegCo they made their views plain 
and the Gilbertese members seemed to welcome the prospect of separation. The Governor, Sir 
John Field, toured the Ellice group in April 1972 and heard the arguments of representatives 
from all the Ellice Islands. As a result, in October 1972 the Heath Government sent Anthony                   The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
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Kershaw, the Parliamentary Undersecretary who had responsibility for dependencies in the 
FCO, to assess the Ellice aspirations. At Tarawa he found a few senior Ellice civil servants 
who deplored the idea, but he also found Gilbertese civil servants who would welcome the 
departure of their Ellice colleagues. In the Ellice group he found calmly-stated but unanimous 
insistence on separation. Benjamin Kofe (of Funafuti) said there were differences of custom, 
language, and race. Having lived in the Gilberts on and off for forty years, he was concerned 
that the two peoples could not get along in the long run. If they did not separate, “the Ellice 
identity will be lost into, or swallowed up by  the Gilberts within another 20  years or so” 
because of inter-marriage and use of spoken Gilbertese. Kershaw  warned of the economic 
consequences and said they could never be independence if their bills were paid by someone 
else. But he made it clear that Britain would not “force people to live under a regime they did 
not  want”.  From  the  Gilberts’  point  of  view,  Reuben  Uatioa  told  the  FCO  officials 
accompanying  Kershaw  that  he  was  content  with  the  status  quo  but  would  not  admit  any 
federal arrangements. He said Ellice people had “... typical Polynesian insularity. They liked 
doing  things  by  themselves  in  their  own  groups”  (Funafuti  meeting,  1972).  Returning  to 
London, Kershaw reported to Sir Alex Douglas-Home, the Secretary of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, on the need to face up the Ellice demands. They were happy to be a 
British dependency, but were “absolutely unwilling” to be ruled by the Gilbertese. He had 
portrayed the difficulties for them and was told by one speaker that they could fall back on the 
simple  life  of  fifty  years  back,  of  ‘fish  and  coconuts’.  His  conclusion  was  that  accepting 
separation could avert the possibility of another Anguilla-style secession which would damage 
Britain’s reputation in the Pacific. He rated the chance of a UDI by the Ellice Islanders as high. 
He believed that they could not be independent, “nor do they want to be”. He recommended 
that a commissioner should be sent out to make a full report on the fiscal implications of 
separation (Kershaw, 1972). 
From Kershaw’s mission came a sense that separation could not be avoided. It is therefore 
necessary to consider now the methods and manner adopted by the British Government. This 
was undoubtedly affected by major recent changes in Whitehall. The Colonial Office had been 
closed  in  1966  by  amalgamation  with  the  Commonwealth  Relations  Office  into  a  single 
Commonwealth Office. This had a very short life and in 1968 was merged with the Foreign 
Office  into  the  Foreign  &  Commonwealth  Office  (FCO)  for  which  priorities  were  very 
different. A Pacific Dependent Territories Department was retained as a joint organ shared 
with the new Ministry  of Overseas Development. But the main focus  of the FCO was on 
Europe, North America, and defence. Those outside these fields were regarded as ‘odds and 
sods’. A colonial official, who transferred to the FCO and was sent to the Pacific, wrote that 
colonial ‘retreads’ were among the sods and the “real bottom of the odds and sods league were 
departments  dealing  with  the  remaining  Dependent  Territories”  (Stuart,  2001:  92).  And  a 
question soon hung over these as in 1973 the Prime Minister ordered that a ‘Performance 
Analysis and Review’ (PAR) should be conducted for all remaining dependencies. Out of this 
review the policy of ‘accelerated decolonization’ emerged in 1975. 
From this atmosphere, the retiring Deputy-Undersecretary of the  FCO,  Sir  Leslie Monson, 
went out as commissioner to report on Ellice separation in 1973. His arrival at Vaitupu must 
have been a cultural revelation. As it is a reef island he had to cross the surf to get there. His 
status entitled him to a traditional canoe from the vessel he arrived in - rather than being taken 
ashore by the ship’s motor boat - but he was not of such elevated status that the canoe was W. D. McIntyre 
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borne aloft over the surf, so he had to get out and wade knee-deep in his suit carrying his FCO 
briefcase. He then had to stand dripping wet while a host of greeters sang all three verses of 
‘God  Save  the  Queen’  first  in  English  and  then  Tuvaluan  (Michael  Walsh,  personal 
communication, 2010). 
Monson  consulted  widely  and  tabled  a  comprehensive  report.  He  found  a  “self-contained 
community, enjoying a large degree of self-government with a minimum of control by central 
authorities”  (Monson,  1973:  3).  He  listened  to  some  absurdly  ambitious  Ellice  demands: 
separation by 1974; half of the GEIC reserve fund; half of the Colony’s shipping fleet; the cash 
equivalent  of  capital  expended  at  Tarawa  to  go  towards  a  new  high  school;  guaranteed 
continued  employment  at  the  phosphate  workings  on  Ocean  Island,  and  the  transfer  of 
Christmas  Island.  Monson’s  response  would  have  come  as  a  shock.  Separation  would  be 
possible subject to certain conditions. There had to be a referendum on the issue. The only 
asset transfer would be one vessel. There could be no claims on phosphate royalties, nor on any 
part of the Reserve Fund, even though Ellice Islanders had contributed by their work on Ocean 
Island. None of the Line or Phoenix Islands would be transferred (Monson, 1973: 57). There 
are those who believed that the conditions were designed to deter Ellice separation or to test 
their resolve. It is more likely that they stemmed from Monson’s conviction that the demands 
were unreasonable and that, whatever the outcome, it should not prejudice the viability of the 
Gilbert Islands. 
Yet,  Monson  had  understood  Ellice  feelings  and  motivation.  At  one  of  the  outer  island 
meetings where he gave assurance that increased British financial aid could be forthcoming, 
because  no  phosphate  royalties  would  go  to  Ellice  after  separation.  Some  hearers  were 
sceptical of this promise. But one elder waxed lyrical on his faith in the British Government 
since it was “... known to give aid to ‘niggers’ in Africa and elsewhere”, and they knew the 
British “... would prefer to give money to ‘white people’ like themselves” (Walsh, personal 
communication). Monson also realized the  effects of intermarriage. Politically, he said the 
separation movement was “a measure of the extent to which progress in creating representative 
institutions at the centre of Government has outgrown the evolution of a sense of national unity 
in the Colony as a whole” (Monson, 1973: 57). The over-riding Ellice motivation was fear that 
they would be overwhelmed by the more numerous Gilbertese and that they wanted to preserve 
their identity; also fear that they would be shut out of employment opportunities in any post-
independence arrangement by the Gilbertese. They realized that they had to separate before not 
after self-government; for, however harsh the conditions the British might impose, they would 
be even worse off if left to the tender mercies of the Gilbertese in a post self-government 
divorce.  
Monson had heard no mention while in the islands of the idea of independence. But before 
finalizing his report he received a memo from a 48-year-old New Zealand-educated former 
schoolteacher now working on Nauru. Toalipi Lauti, who was GEIC labour relations officer 
with the Nauru Phosphate Corporation (and was another admirer of Hammer de Roburt), sent a 
submission to Monson in which he said that separation was “ ... a natural step caused by the 
political and constitutional changes that the  Gilbert and Ellice people  have experienced  as 
being administered as one group”. Further advances along these lines would be damaging to 
both groups. He called for a separate government and went on:                    The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
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Ellice people will continue to advance politically and constitutionally until such time as 
the people of Ellice wish to gain independence.  
Before that happened, he said they should “take over the government in a most natural way”. 
Monson found this a well-argued statement of the political case for separation and referred to it 
in his report, but he also pointed out that it was “the only reference I received for the prospect 
of eventual independence” (Lauti & Monson, 1973).  
FCO  officials  were  dismayed  by  the  Monson  Report.  The  Head  of  the  Pacific  Dependent 
Territories Department said a separate Ellice Colony would be  “a financial, economic and 
administrative nonsense”. It could never be viable and would require permanent financial aid. 
As a new Governor was due in Tarawa later in 1973, he sought his confidential advice as to 
whether  any  delaying  tactic  might  be  possible  (Nicholas,  1973).  John  H.  Smith  was  an 
experienced colonial official having served for nineteen years in Northern Nigeria both before 
and after independence and more recently for two years as Financial Secretary in the Solomon 
Islands. He doubted whether it was feasible to “apply the brakes”. Arriving in Tarawa, he 
found people regarded separation as inevitable. All he could suggest was that it should be done 
according to an agreed time-table and be linked with advance to internal self-government. It 
seemed that at best they might get a year’s delay and the FCO Supervising Undersecretary for 
the  Pacific,  Nick  Larmour,  came  reluctantly  to  the  conclusion  that  they  faced  the  choice 
between  “...  creating  another  mini  colony  or  running  the  risk  of  having  to  deal  with  a 
breakdown of law and order”. When Lord Balneil, the Minister of State, put it to the Secretary 
of State he said separation did not make economic or administrative sense, but the decision 
must rest with “the people themselves”. Sir Alex Douglas-Home was philosophical about it, 
but wanted to be tough with the conditions:  
There are a lot of nonseneses in this world so I suppose we can connive at another. But 
the cost is deplorable and I think we should say that, if they want to go their silly ways, 
they must bear more of the charge (Douglas-Home, 1973). 
The decision was announced in the GEIC Legislative Council on 27 November 1973. The 
referendum went ahead in August-September 1974 and, in a huge reversal of policy for Britain, 
the UN Special Committee on Decolonization was invited to observe it. The Visiting Mission 
had the advantage of two Commonwealth members who were familiar with British modes of 
operation (Smith, 2011: 119-122). It was chaired by Sierra Leonean diplomat, Mrs Famah 
Joka-Bangura, assisted by Dilip Lahiri (India) and A. F. Al-Masri (Syria). After briefing by the 
FCO in London, they flew to Tarawa and sailed on to the Ellice, where they visited six islands. 
They could report that in a poll with a voter turnout of 88% 3,799 voted in favour of separation 
(92%) and 293 against. Their report also agreed with the Governor that it was “... essential that 
the outside world learnt more of the special difficulties which confront small territories in their 
endeavours to take their place in the modern world” (UN Visiting Mission, 1974). 
The British Government abided by the wishes of the Ellice Islanders. It only remained for the 
separation to be effected on the ground. A new constitution came into effect in the GEIC on 1 
May 1974. In lieu of the Legislative Council, a new House of Assembly of 28 members was 
elected. It voted in favour of Ellice separation in December 1974. The eight members who 
represented the Ellice  Islands constituted an Ellice Committee. They decided on the name 
Tuvalu (ancient usage signifying ‘eight standing together’). They opted for a Cabinet with a W. D. McIntyre 
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Chief Minister, two other elected ministers, and two ex-officio ministers. A new capital would 
be built on Funafuti. They proposed that the 8 Tuvaluan members should complete their term 
as a separate Tuvalu legislature. The date set for transfer of administration was 1 January 1976. 
To  confirm  the  desire  for  separation  and  work  out  the  details,  a  new  Head  of  the  Pacific 
Dependent  Territories  Department  and  his  deputy  visited  the  islands  in  March  1975  and 
attended  the  Tuvalu  Separation  Conference  held  in  the  GEIC  House  of  Assembly.  It  was 
agreed that there would be no bureaucratic tier between the FCO and the British representative 
in Tuvalu to be titled Her Majesty’s Commissioner. A separate Attorney-General was also 
appointed. One motor vessel was transferred to the new government. The Motufoa School 
would be expanded to include a full secondary level. 
Tuvalu came into being on 1 October 1975. Its legislature, the House of Assembly, comprised 
the 8 elected island representatives with 3 ex-offico members. It elected Toalipi Lauti as Chief 
Minister.  On  1  January  1976,  the  separate  administration  took  over  at  Funafuti.  Half  the 
executive  consisted  of  politicians;  the  other  half  of  civil  servants.  It  was  described  as  a 
ministerial  system  falling  short  of  full  internal  self-government.  In  December  1976,  Lauti 
moved a motion for independence in 1978. A Constitutional Committee comprising all the 
elected members was created. Professor David Murray, who had already advised in the Gilbert 
Islands,  was  invited  to  guide  the  discussions.  He  drew  up  a  list  of  the  issues  that  needed 
decision: whether to adopt a republican or monarchic model; whether a parliamentary or non-
parliamentary executive was desired; the type of legislature and electorate; the public service, 
arrangements for constitutional amendment. The committee favoured retaining the Queen as 
Head of State represented by a Governor-General, and a single chamber Parliament (Murray, 
1997: 259-274). 
Lauti visited Britain as a guest of the UK Government in October/November 1977 to discuss 
preparations  for  independence.  These  were  finalized  at  a  full  Constitutional  Conference  in 
Marlborough House in February 1978 to which Tuvalu sent no less that 52 delegates, including 
all  MPs.  They  were  disappointed  that  the  Minister  of  State  scheduled  to  preside,  Lord 
Goronwy-Roberts, was delayed by snow and the proceedings were opened by a civil servant, 
Richard Posnett, the Dependent Territories Adviser. They were also disappointed that they got 
nothing from the GEIC Reserve Fund, nor any of the Line or Phoenix Islands. As Rev. Iosia 
Taomia put it: ‘We came out of the Colony empty handed” (Cmnd 7144, 1978: 21).They did 
receive promises of three types of financial aid: a Special Development Fund to deal with 
problems arising from separation; development aid that was renewable; and budgetary aid to 
cover  immediate  deficits.  But  they  were  so  dismayed  by  their  treatment,  not  simply  the 
conditions  of  independence,  but  by  the  lack  of  basic  courtesies  extended  towards  them  in 
marked contrast to the generous hospitality accorded to visitors to the islands. Having flown 
half-way round the world to a cold London winter, they were so disaffected by their treatment 
that  they  bestowed  the  Polynesian  gifts  they  had  brought  along  to  their  hotel  porter  in 
Westminster! Independence Day was 1 October 1978, the third anniversary of separation. The 
Queen sent Princess Margaret to represent her, but before the celebrations had finished she was 
taken ill and had to be flown to Australia. Her private secretary, Lord Napier, read her speech 
and the Queen’s message was read by Tom Layng, the one and only Queen’s Commissioner to 
Tuvalu. 
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Conclusion 
In his valedictory despatch, Layng admitted that people would say that Tuvalu was the nation 
least prepared for independence. Only two Tuvaluans working in the country had university 
degrees. In one ministry, only the minister and his secretary had more than primary education. 
But  he  favoured  independence  because  in  all  fields  other  than  ‘top  level  government’  the 
islands had always been independent. Polynesians, he said, were proud, even arrogant, and 
regarded themselves as superior to other races they had encountered. He quoted Toalipi Lauti’s 
frequent assertion: “We will do things in our own way”. Layng felt that Tuvaluans could not 
bear being looked down as ‘colonial’ by other Pacific islanders (Layng, 1978). The GEIC 
Government  had  never  endeavoured  to  forge  a  nation  and  Tuvalu  would  not  stand  for 
permanent minority status. Ideas of federation, loosely floated in the 1950s and 1960s, were 
never  seriously  pursued.  Barrie  Macdonald,  historian  of  the  Gilbert  and  Ellice  Islands, 
concludes that Tuvaluans chose the difficult path they did “to preserve their cultural identity” 
(Macdonald, 1975: 43). Whether that identity can be preserved in the face of sea-level rise and 
possible future evacuation to New Zealand or elsewhere remains to be seen. 
Acknowledgements 
In  gathering  material,  I  am  grateful  for  discussions  with  Ian  Campbell,  Barrie  Macdonald, 
Doug  Munro,  David  Murray,  John  H.  Smith,  Michael  Walsh  and  John  Wilson.  The  usual 
disclaimers apply. 
References 
Butcher, M. (2012) ‘…When the long trick’s over’: Donald Kennedy in the Pacific, Bendigo, 
Holland House. 
Cmnd 7144 (1978) Report of the Tuvalu Constitutional Conference, February. Great Britain 
Parliamentary Papers, 1977-78, VIII. 
CO Print (1957) Region by region survey of dependencies, GEN 174/012, May. CAB 134/1551 
in British National Archives, Kew. 
Douglas-Home, A. (1973) Minute by Sir Alec Douglas-Home 16 Nov. 1973 on Lord Balneil to 
Secretary of State, 14 November. FCO 32/985. 
FCO 32 Original correspondence of the Pacific Dependent Territories Department of the Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office in British National Archives, Kew. 
Funafuti meeting (1972) Notes of meeting at Funafuti, 7 October. FCO 32/873. 
Kershaw, A. (1972) Notes by Kershaw on Pacific visit, 19 October. FCO 32/873. 
Laracy, H. ed. (1983) Tuvalu: A History, Suva, Fiji, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific. 
Lauti, T. & Monson, L. (1973) Lauti to Monson 20 Feb. In Monson to Nicholas 23 July. FCO 32/985. 
Layng, T. (1978) Valedictory despatch to David Owen, 20 September. FCO 32/1523. W. D. McIntyre 
  146
Macdonald,  B.  (1970) ‘Constitutional Development in the Gilbert and Ellice  Islands Colony’, 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 139-145. 
Macdonald, B. (1975) ‘Secession in the Defence of Identity’, Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 16, No. 1, 
pp. 26-44. 
Macdonald,  B.  (1982)  Cinderellas  of  the  Empire:  Towards  a  History of  Kiribati  and  Tuvalu, 
Canberra, Australian National University Press. 
Macdonald, B. (1988) In Pursuit of the Sacred Trust: Trusteeship and Independence in Nauru, 
Wellington, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 
Maude H.E. (1968) Of Islands and Men: Studies in Pacific History, Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press. 
McIntyre,  W.D.  (1960)  ‘Disraeli’s  Colonial  Policy:  The  Creation  of  the  Western  Pacific  High 
Commission, 1874-1877’, Historical Studies Australia & New Zealand, Vol. 9, No. 35, pp. 279-294.  
Monson, L. (1973) Report of the Commissioner appointed to study the Relationship of the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands, April. FCO 32/984. 
Morgan, D.J. (1980) Guidance towards Self-Government in British Colonies: 1941-1971, London, 
Macmillan. 
Munro, D. (1996) ‘Samoan Pastors in Tuvalu, 1865-1899’ in D. Munro & A. Thornley (eds.) The 
Covenant Makers: Islander Missionaries in the Pacific, Suva, Fiji, Pacific Theological College 
and the University of the South Pacific, pp. 124-157. 
Munro, D. & Firth, S. (1986) ‘Towards Colonial Protectorates: The case of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 63-67. 
Murray,  D.J.  (1982)  ‘Constitution-making  in  Tuvalu  and  Kiribati’  in  Pacific  Constitutions: 
Proceedings of Canberra Law Workshop VI, Canberra, Australian National University, pp. 125-134. 
Murray, D.J. (1997) ‘Constitutional Instruments in Kiribati and Tuvalu’ in H.J. Hiery & J.M. 
Mackenzie  (Eds.)  European  Impact  and  Pacific  Influence:  British  and  German  Colonial 
Administration in the Pacific Islands and Indigenous Responses, London, IB Tauris, pp. 259-274. 
Nicholas, J. (1973) Nicholas to Gov. J. Smith. 1 August. FCO 32/984. 
Scarr, D. (1968) Fragments of Empire: A History of the Western Pacific High Commission 1877-
1914, Canberra, Australian National University Press. 
Stuart, A. (2001) Of Cargoes, Colonies, and Kings: Diplomatic and Administrative Service in 
Africa and the Pacific, London, Radcliffe Press. 
UN Visiting Mission (1974) Report on Visiting Mission to Gilbert & Ellice Islands. FCO 32/984. 
Walsh, M. (2010) Letter from M. Walsh, former GEIC Government Economist, to author, 16 
December.   